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Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen begins his recently published book on 
discrimination by distinguishing three main general questions that 
are undertaken in the book, and that organize its structure, namely: 
what discrimination is, what makes it wrong, and in which cases dif-
ferential treatment is discriminatory, or what should be done about 
wrongful discrimination. Both the approach and the layout of these 
questions make the book a thought-provoking rewarding reading.
In part 1 of the book, Lippert-Rasmussen examines several types 
of discrimination. This analysis is not an exhaustive taxonomy, but 
one that allows the reader both to identify a reference framework to 
allocate the moral wrongness of discrimination, and gives a glimpse 
of a proposed counteraction of discrimination acts, and its conse-
quences. By doing so, the author advances the content and motiva-
tion of parts 2, and 3 of the book. In part 1, Lippert-Rasmussen 
advances many highly relevant debates on discrimination. Among 
the debates presented in this part, high points that merit further 
discussion include: what he calls the generic deinition of discrimina-
tion which offers a broad, in contrast to the usual narrow definition, 
approach to discrimination. To wit, Lippert-Rasmussen defines ge-
neric discrimination as follows: “to discriminate against someone is 
to treat her disadvantageously relative to others because she has or 
is believed to have some particular feature that those others do not 
have.” Another relevant point is the decision to stick to group discrimi-
nation as the approach that better accounts both what generally both-
ers people of discrimination, and the detailed treatment of indirect 
discrimination. On the one hand, one of the reasons he offers for this 
move is that, in his view, most of the times when something is said 
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to be discriminated, it concerns group discrimination. On the other 
hand, indirect discrimination is understood in his account as an ex-
ample of non-intentional discrimination.
Particularly interesting here is the debate he opens on the generic 
definition of discrimination. In a nutshell, discrimination is defined 
as disadvantageous differential treatment. Far from a discrimination 
skeptic that disregards affirmative action, he aims at revisiting the 
concept of discrimination, and what is morally wrong about it from 
the very beginning. This intention is clear when he argues in page 
15 that: “there is not even a presumption that someone who engages 
in generic (italics added) discrimination acts wrongly.” However, the 
parts of the book that analyze cases of what we may call advanta-
geous differential treatment, or non-wrongful discrimination, are 
somewhat unclear. For example, in pages 23, 25, and 27, Lippert-
Rasmussen argues that nepotism is not a discriminatory act in the 
relevant sense, while in pages 41 to 46 what qualifies as advantageous 
differential treatment remains vague.
Lippert-Rasmussen moves a step forward in the definition of 
discrimination and states in page 16 that discrimination is essentially 
comparative with respect to individuals. The author believes that a fea-
ture that may turn generic discrimination to be morally wrong, or at 
least morally relevant, lies in (unjustified) disadvantageous treatment 
in comparison to others. This further feature of generic discrimina-
tion opens the floor to make a relevant distinction. Whilst he states 
that equal treatment and even non-disadvantageous discrimination 
may well not be morally wrong, he also considers that compared 
differential treatment between two people is morally wrong. A more 
in depth discussion of what makes discrimination wrong is under-
taken in part 2 of the book. The relevant differential background 
of both conceptions is that while the comparative account identifies 
the moral wrongness of discrimination as due to the inequality that 
it generates, the other account perceives the wrongness in the dis-
criminatory act. In the latter sense, the wrongness would not be 
only based on the effects generated neither on a particular situation, 
nor on further counterfactual situations, but on the unjustified dif-
ferential treatment to a member of (in Lippert-Rasmussen’s account) 
a social salient group. To illustrate the point: to assess whether some-
one is discriminating another in a morally relevant way, it should 
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be first established how that person would treat a subject from an-
other equally salient social group in the same situation. It may be 
said that what justifies this comparison remains somewhat unclear. 
This feature of the author’s account of the wrongness of discrimina-
tion defines his characterization of the harm-based account, and in 
particular of harm as the necessary condition of the wrongness of 
discrimination, most of all in pages 160 and 161.
In chapter 1, Lippert-Rasmussen sticks to group discrimination as 
a descriptive concept that, in his view, better explains what peo-
ple talk about when they talk about discrimination. He points out 
that although group discrimination is the proxy for an account of the 
wrongness of discrimination (and many times in the text it seems to 
be the only objectionable type of discrimination), it just is a neces-
sary condition for wrongful discrimination, but not a sufficient one. 
In other words, group discrimination is not always morally wrong. 
Lippert-Rasmussen proceeds to distinguish different senses in which 
it might be morally wrong. The reasons given in favor of establish-
ing group discrimination as the main concept that qualifies as dis-
crimination finishes at this point. Although Lippert-Rasmussen’s 
view in this point is not clear, the reader may intuitively guess that 
he remains neutral on the distinctions made regarding the wrong-
ness of group discriminatory treatment. To wit: Lippert-Rasmussen 
remains neutral about the moral distinction between direct and in-
direct discrimination, cognitive and non-cognitive discrimination, 
and valuation based and non-valuation based discrimination. A clear 
position regarding these subjects would have been helpful to clarify 
some normative points in part 3 of the book. It would also have been 
helpful to have a clear characterization of when is (unjustified) disad-
vantageous treatment morally wrong.
In part 2 of the book, Lippert-Rasmussen assesses three concrete 
accounts of the wrongness of discrimination: Larry Alexander’s ac-
count on objectionable mental states, conditioned by false believes, 
and resulting in bias; Deborah Hellman’s account on discrimination 
demeaning equal human worth; and Thomas Scanlon’s account on 
the offensive meaning of discrimination. High points include: in-
trinsically wrong discrimination, instrumental reasons to assess the 
moral wrongness of discrimination, objective meaning accounts, 
Lippert-Rasmussen’s harm-based account of the wrongness of dis-
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crimination, and his version of a prioritarian harm-based account—
a desert-prioritarian account. Briefly, though not less relevant, 
it should be noticed that one of the main difficulties for Lippert-
Rasmussen’s desert-prioritarian account is the prioritarian calculus. 
According to the desert-prioritarian account, individuals which are 
comparatively worse have greater moral value than those that are 
comparatively better off. While Lippert-Rasmussen is aware of some 
objections regarding equal value of both the discriminatee, and the 
discriminator (166), and accommodates some cases to his account, 
the metric of prioritarian calculations remains unclear.
Particularly interesting here is his approach to harm-based ac-
counts of discrimination (154 ff) to which the author is more sym-
pathetic. Broadly, Lippert-Rasmussen argues that one main concern 
with the wrongness of discrimination, given that it is not always 
wrong, are its harmful outcomes. Some statements defended in part 
1 of the book have a pervasive impact in this second part of the book. 
For example, in part one Lippert-Rasmussen states that discrimina-
tion is essentially comparative, and, as mentioned before, this com-
pletely determines the account of the wrongness of discrimination. 
To wit, according to this account, the wrongness of a discrimina-
tory act is based on its effects, and not on any other intrinsic moral 
wrongness it may generate. In addition, a discriminatory act will 
be harmful if and only if the discriminatee is worse than she would 
have been had she not been discriminated. However, discrimination 
may be morally wrong for other reasons than the ones mentioned in 
Lippert-Rasmussen’s approach in part 2 of the book. For instance, 
racist, sexist, male chauvinistic attitudes may be morally bad both 
for the discriminatee and for the discriminator. Or they may have 
no bad effects in the discriminatee, whilst remaining morally bad for 
the discriminator, in terms of attitudes, decisive reasons for action, 
and bias generally generated by false beliefs.
On this line of reasoning, discrimination based on inequalities 
may be morally wrong, not just because of the alleged injustice of 
inequalities, but also due to the fact that it emphasizes previous in-
justices, structural or otherwise. Lippert-Rasmussen is aware of that 
previous injustices aggravate the harm of discriminatory acts (55 and 
62). However, the harm-based account defended by the author does 
not take into account moral wrongs other than foreseen harmful out-
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comes to constitute the wrong-making property, (155). For exam-
ple, discriminatory acts may generate unintended harms, and both 
these harmful byproducts, and the discriminatory act generating 
both types of outcomes, raise moral concerns. It seems to me that 
these aggravating factors are disregarded in Lippert-Rasmussen’s ac-
count of the wrongness of discrimination.
If we consider it in more detail, we will see that in part one of the 
book Lippert-Rasmussen conceives indirect discrimination as a non-
intentional mental state1 (73). Accordingly, indirect discrimination 
may be wrong in light of its due outcomes. However, discrimination 
based on mental states may well be intentional, and therefore mor-
ally wrong not only in virtue of its outcomes, but of its reasons for 
action. Hence, if Lippert-Rasmussen agrees with the claim that in-
direct discrimination may well be equally harmful, we may add that 
this would not be solely due to its harmful outcomes, but also of its 
reasons for action.
Finally, in part 3 of the book, Lippert-Rasmussen introduces 
three so-called non-ideal themes: proportional representation in 
connection with punishment, discrimination on the labour market, 
discrimination in the private sphere, and, finally, racial profiling. He 
discusses them in light of his proposed account of discrimination, 
the desert-prioritarian account. The chapter on discrimination in 
the private sphere is particularly interesting.
Despite the set of issues that need clarification, and further de-
velopment, Born Free and Equal is a worthwhile enjoyable read, and it 
sets a precedent for further and fruitful discussion on the somewhat 
neglected topic of discrimination in political philosophy.
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1 The discussion on the wrongness of indirect discrimination remains open, 
and Lippert-Rasmussen comes back to it at the annex of chapter 6, at pages 177, 
and 178.
